My assessment of President Irro's United States visit is mixed because it produced bills, briefings and bad optics. He reportedly met Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Frank Garcia, so claims that no American official received him are wrong. Yet the State Department, White House and other senior institutions issued no comparable public account of the meeting, its agenda or its significance. The problem was not zero contact. It was minimal public political ownership.
That ownership existed on earlier visits. When President Dahir Riyale Kahin travelled to Washington in 2008, the State Department announced meetings with senior officials from State, USAID, Defense and the National Security Council. In 2022, the Bureau of African Affairs publicly acknowledged President Muse Bihi's meeting with Assistant Secretary Molly Phee. Irro's public protocol was plainly weaker.
Scheduling softens that conclusion. Secretary Rubio and Garcia were travelling abroad during part of Irro's visit, while Somalia's Hassan Sheikh Mohamud later received no publicly visible executive access above Garcia during the United Nations General Assembly. Limited access to the top of the administration may therefore reflect bandwidth as much as policy towards Somaliland.
The congressional gains deserve assessment on their own merits. The Somaliland Economic Access and Opportunity Act brought financial isolation before Treasury, while the new Somaliland Travel and Investment Act would separate travel advice and consider a representative office in Hargeisa. Both are commendable, practical steps that build momentum even without recognition.
Another positive was the realism now shaping Somaliland's American case. Irro presented a transactional offer built around nine concrete American gains, not another appeal for sympathy. Yet New York exposed the missing second half. Somaliland reached the United Nations without presenting a global recognition framework capable of organising its case for every government, not only Washington. The American pitch has matured. The worldwide doctrine still needs to be shaped.
Hargeisa still owes Somalilanders an explanation. A presidential trip with ministers, advisers, the First Lady and the Speaker of the House requires objectives that the foreign minister could not achieve alone. If presidential access was not secured before departure, the planning failed its first test. Access should come before airfare.
Appearances at the right-leaning Hudson Institute and the more establishment Council on Foreign Relations were also valuable. They carried Somaliland's case across Washington's policy spectrum. Yet think tank access is not mass communication. Why did the delegation not secure interviews with major networks such as Fox News and CNN? Presidential travel should reach voters as well as specialists.
The promoted demonstration looked disorganised, while Somaliland officials protesting like ordinary activists created poor optics for a government seeking state treatment.
Washington's intentions remain harder to judge. Somaliland may rank too low for Cabinet attention. Iran and wider regional calculations may have delayed a sensitive decision. The administration may prefer routine bureaucratic engagement without changing policy. Washington may also have kept the Garcia meeting unannounced to avoid implying parity between Somaliland and Somalia before policy changes. On that reading, protocol was deliberately prevented from outrunning policy. Quiet talks may also be under way whose value will become visible later. The public record cannot distinguish among these possibilities.
Secrecy is not fanciful. Before Israel recognised Somaliland in December 2025, Irro had quietly visited Israel and met its senior leadership. The result appeared after the diplomacy. President Trump has since said Somaliland recognition is under study, which is neither a promise nor a rejection. Public ceremony cannot be the only measure of substance, but secrecy cannot become the excuse offered for every empty stage.
Somaliland should also stop treating Washington as Berbera's only serious customer. As I argued in the buyer's advantage, dependence reduces leverage. Hargeisa needs credible strategic options without reckless threats or theatrical power games. The United States should see a valuable partner, not a permanently reserved asset.